SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we hope
to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the more interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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FIRST AMENDMENT-SLANDER-NAME-ALLING IS PER SE NON-ACTIONABLE SLANDER WHEN IT IS EXPRESSED AS AN OPINION IN A
CONTEXT WHICH REVEALS TO THE LISTENER THAT THE REMARKS
ARE NOT BASED UPON UNDISCLOSED

FACTs- Ward v. Zelikovsky,

136 N.J. 515, 643 A.2d 972 (1994).
The plaintiffs in Ward v. Zelikovsky, Mary and Charles Ward,
were speaking to approximately one hundred of their neighbors at
a condominium association board meeting when the defendant,
Johanan Zelikovsky, jumped from his seat and shouted, "Don't listen to these people. They don't like Jews. She's a bitch. I remember her. She's a bitch." Id. at 523-24, 643 A.2d at 975. The Wards
sued Zelikovsky for slander seeking special, compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 525, 643 A.2d at 976.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, found that the
offensive remarks did not fall within the four recognized categories
of slander per se which require the statements to impute either (1)
commission of a crime, (2) contraction of a loathsome disease (3)
occupational incompetence or misconduct, or (4) unchastity of a
woman. Id. at 526, 643 A.2d at 977 (citing Gnapinsky v. Goldyn, 23
N.J. 243, 250-51, 128 A.2d 697 (1957)). As a result, the trial court
instructed that the plaintiffs were required to prove special damages and that, should the plaintiff's fail to do so, the jury must
cease its deliberations. Id.
Subsequently, the jury found that Mrs. Ward had been slandered but that she did not sustain special damages. Id. at 527, 643
A.2d at 977. Disregarding the court's instructions, the jury proceeded to conclude that Mrs. Ward had suffered general damages.
Id. Although the jury awarded no compensatory damages, it did
award punitive damages. Id. The jury found that Mr. Ward had
also been slandered and that he sustained both special and general
damages, but that the amount of those damages was zero. Id. Nevertheless, as in the case of Mrs. Ward, the jury awarded Mr. Ward
punitive damages. Id. Following the jury's verdict, the trial court
reminded the jury that nominal special damages should be
awarded to justify the punitive damage awards. Id. Consequently,
the jury rendered a second verdict awarding each of the Wards
nominal general and special damages, and punitive damages. Id.
The court denied Zelikovsky's motion for a new trial on the slander
claim. Id.
On appeal, The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the trial court's decision by expanding the four cate-
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gories of slander per se to include imputations of racial or ethnic
bigotry, thus eliminating the need to prove special damages. Id.
(citing Ward v. Zelikovsky, 263 N.J. Super. 497, 511-12, 623 A.2d 285
(1993)). In addition, the appellate court upheld the punitive damages awards. Id. (citation omitted). The dissent, however, disagreed with the majority's view that the defendant's remarks were
defamatory as a matter of law or slanderous per se. Id. (citation
omitted).
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted the defendant's petition for certification which sought a review of the punitive damages
awards. Id. at 528, 643 A.2d at 978 (citing Ward v. Zelikovsky, 134
N.J. 476 (1993)). Refusing to extend the four categories of slander
per se to include imputations of racial or ethnic bigotry, the Court
concluded that the defendant's statements were merely non-actionable name-calling and that plaintiffs failed to prove special damages in support of their punitive damage awards. Id. at 541-42, 643
A.2d at 984-85.
Writing for the majority, Justice Garibaldi commenced the
court's analysis by distinguishing the instant case from libel suits
involving media defendants. Id. at 528, 643 A.2d at 978 (citations
omitted). Emphasizing the distinction, the justice suggested that a
certain measure of thought precedes the words printed in newspapers and magazines. Id. In contrast, the justice noted that spoken
words usually do not command a similar degree of deliberation.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 568(3) (1977)).
Continuing, the justice explained that the apparent deliberation of
a writer or speaker will influence the way in which the audience
perceives the speech. Id. Thus, the justice proposed that the central inquiry in a slander suit is whether a reasonable audience
could perceive the language as defamatory. Id. at 528, 643 A.2d at
978 (quotation omitted). Finally, Justice Garibaldi reminded the
court that such a determination is a question of law for the court.
Id. at 529, 643 A.2d at 978 (citation omitted).
To determine whether the defendant's statements were susceptible of a defamatory meaning, the court considered the content, verifiability, and context of the statements. Id. at 529-33, 643
A.2d at 978-80. First, the court proffered that name-calling does
not contain a defamatory content that causes irreparable harm to
an individual's reputation. Id. at 529, 643 A.2d at 978. Illustrating,
the court remarked that individuals may sometimes resort to namecalling in the course of an altercation without any intent to make a
defamatory assertion. Id. at 530, 643 A.2d at 979 (quotation omit-
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ted). Furthermore, the court noted that reasonable listeners ordinarily understand that comments made during such altercations
are nothing more than mere name-calling. Id.
Proceeding, the court next explored the verifiability of the defendant's statements as an indication of the defendant's culpability. Id. at 531, 643 A.2d at 979. As a preliminary matter, the court
declared that true statements are positively protected under the
First Amendment. Id. at 530, 643 A.2d at 979 (citation omitted).
Distinguishing opinion statements from factual statements, the
court noted that opinions are not capable of proof of truth or falsity and are therefore afforded considerable protection under the
law. Id. at 531, 643 A.2d at 979. The court proposed, however, that
harm resulting from defamatory opinion statements is redressable
when those statements imply the existence of underlying facts that
are false. Id. Accordingly, the court concluded that loose, figurative or embellished language will most often be non-actionable because it is less likely to imply specific facts. Id. at 532, 643 A.2d at
980 (quotation omitted).
Finally, the court considered the context in which defendant's
statements were made. Id. at 532, 643 A.2d at 980. According to
the court, determining defamatory meaning requires the court to
look beyond the spoken words themselves to consider their overall
impression on the listener. Id. Explaining, the court stated that
the listener's interpretation of alleged defamatory words will be
based in part on the context in which those words are heard. Id.
The court opined that a listener is less likely to accord a statement
its literal meaning when it is uttered during an argument or it is an
exclamation unrelated to the topic of discussion. Id.
After examining the law of other jurisdictions, the court applied NewJersey's slander law to the facts in the instant case. Id. at
537, 643 A.2d at 982. Ultimately, the court determined that defendant's use of the word "bitch" in reference to Mrs. Ward constituted non-actionable name-calling because (1) its content was not
ascertainable, (2) it was incapable of objective truth or falsity and
was therefore not verifiable, and (3) the context in which it was
spoken did not lend it credibility. Id. Similarly, disavowing the appellate court's expansion of the categories of slander per se, the
court determined that defendant's statement regarding the Wards'
dislike for Jews was non-actionable under the four categories of
slander per se. Id. at 537, 538, 643 A.2d at 983.
Specifically, the court reasoned that because the defendant's
statements were not factual and did not appear to be based on fac-
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tual statements known to the audience, the statements were merely
non-actionable name-calling. Id. at 538, 643 A.2d at 983. The
court further intimated that even if defendant's statements had
been found to be defamatory, the plaintiffs did not prove special
damages signifying pecuniary harm due to an injured reputation.
Id. at 541, 643 A.2d at 985. Acknowledging that special damages
are presumed under the four categories of slander per se, Justice
Garibaldi declared that those categories should not be extended to
include racial or ethnic statements. Id. at 541, 643 A.2d at 984
(quotations omitted). Furthermore, the court noted that because
special damages are crucial to recovery in slander, the Wards' punitive damage awards were likewise improper. Id. at 542, 643 A.2d at
985. Concluding, therefore, that allegations of bigotry do not fall
within the purview of slander per se, and that the Wards failed to
prove special damages, the court reversed the appellate division
and remanded the matter to the trial court for entry of an Order
dismissing plaintiffs' claims for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. Id. at 543, 643 A.2d at 985.
Justice Stein filed a separate concurring opinion in which he
conceded that allegations of bigotry do not constitute slander per
se, and that the Wards failed to prove special damages. Id. (Stein,
J., concurring). The justice disagreed, however, with the court's
conclusion that the Wards did not establish a cause of action for
defamation. Id., 643 A.2d at 985-86 (Stein, J., concurring).
Explaining, the justice argued that even though the Wards did
not prevail on their slander claim, they did have sufficient evidence
of defamation to warrant a jury trial. Id., 643 A.2d at 986 (Stein, J.
concurring). Specifically, the justice found that defendant's statements did give rise to an inference that undisclosed facts existed
germane to the allegations. Id. at 545, 643 A.2d at 987 (Stein, J.,
concurring). Continuing, the justice proffered that those present
at the board meeting could have viewed the defendant's statements
to be based on undisclosed facts. Id. Therefore, Justice Stein
maintained that the statements had devastating defamatory potential. Id. Concluding, the justice remarked that the court's decision
usurped the jury's fact-finding function by labelling the defendant's statements non-actionable name-calling as a matter of law. Id.
at 545-46, 643 A.2d at 987 (Stein, J., concurring).
Although the court's conclusion that Zelikovsky's statements
were non-actionable name-calling preserves the First Amendment
right to free speech, it also permits the continuance of uttered hostilities between individuals with no opportunity for redress. Justice
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Stein accurately perceived that the court usurped the jury's factfinding function by holding that the defendant's statements were
non-actionable. After outlining the tripartite analysis used to determine the defamatory nature of one's statements, the majority
disregarded the jury's role in assessing the facts to be applied in
that analysis. In the instant case, the jury heard testimony, examined the context of the statements, and determined that the
statements were slanderous. Affording the trial court's findings no
deference, the supreme court concluded that the Wards had no
cause of action.
Preservation of the First Amendment is crucial to safeguarding
all other rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Deprived of the freedom of thought, speech, and expression, individuals are reduced to automatons of the state. In a society which is
plagued by hate speech and racial and religious tensions, courts
should be loathe to dismiss a cause of action for defamation before
it reaches the jury. Facts which may give rise to a cause of action
for defamation should be examined in their entirety and, when
statements are deemed defamatory, damages should be awarded to
plaintiffs within the scope of the law. Although the First Amendment cannot dictate that individuals speak only when they have
something nice to say, perhaps pocket-books can.
Michelle Capezza

FIRST AMENDMENT-F

wESPEECH-SCHOOL'S RESTRICTION ON

STUDENT'S EXPRESSIONAL

FREEDOM

IN SCHOOL PUBLICATION

MUST BEAR REASONABLE NEXUS TO SCHOOL'S LEGITIMATE PEDAGOGICAL PoLIcY-Desilets v. Clearview Regional Bd. of Educ., 137

N.J. 585, 647 A.2d 150 (1994).
Brien Desilets, a junior high school student, authored reviews
of two "R"-rated films for publication in his school newspaper, the
Pioneer Press. 137 N.j. at 587, 647 A.2d at 151. Objecting to the
content of the reviews, school authorities refused to publish Brien's
work. Subsequently, Brien's mother, Patricia Desilets, brought an
action against the Clearview school board, superintendent, and
principal, alleging that their refusal to publish Brien's articles violated both his state and federal constitutional rights of free expres-
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sion. Contending that their editorial decision was justified by a
legitimate pedagogical policy, the school officials maintained that
they did not abrogate Brien's constitutional freedoms.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, applying the
standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, found no First Amendment violation in the school's action. Id. at 588, 647 A.2d at 151 (citing
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988)). Specifically,
the court held that the school's refusal to publish Brien's reviews
was reasonably related to valid educational interests. Id. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the school authorities had infringed upon
Brien's expressional rights under the New Jersey State Constitution, which, the court declared, offered greater expressional freedom than the federal Constitution. Id.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed
the trial court's judgment. Id. (citing Desilets v. Clearview Regional
Bd. of Educ., 266 N.J. Super. 531, 630 A.2d 333 (App. Div. 1993)).
Relying on Hazelwood, however, the appellate division determined
that Clearview officials had transgressed Brien's federal, not state,
constitutional rights. Id. The court explained that under Hazelwood, the school had offered no valid educational policy to warrant
deletion of "R"-rated film critiques. Id. Conversely, the dissent
concluded that Brien's rights had not been impaired under Hazelwood because the school's decision to withhold publication was rationally linked to legitimate instructional interests. Id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification to identify the kind of expression that may be regulated by educational
policy and to determine proper measures for resolving similar conflicts in the future. Id. Affirming the appellate division, the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that the school authorities did not establish a sufficient pedagogical concern to warrant the censorship
of Brien's reviews and thus violated the First Amendment by withholding publication. Id.
In Part One of the per cuiam opinion, the court applied the
holding and reasoning of Hazelwood. Id. Specifically, the court
noted that Hazelwood held a principal's edit of student-authored
material non-violative of the First Amendment because the censorship was reasonably related to a valid educational interest. Id. at
588-89, 647 A.2d at 151 (citing Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 260). Continuing, the court highlighted Hazelwoodas conclusion that the student
publication was not a public forum and that expression therein
could therefore be subject to reasonably imposed restraints. Id. at
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589, 647 A.2d at 152 (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267). Extending this analysis, the New Jersey Supreme Court declared that
classification of a school publication as a public or a private forum
may determine whether efforts designed to regulate student expression abrogate constitutional freedoms. Id. The court then outlined the permissible boundaries of state action that circumscribe
public expression but found such parameters irrelevant to the instant case because, as the appellate division determined, the Pioneer Press was not a public forum. Id. at 589-90, 647 A.2d at 152.
Praising the soundness of the appellate court's findings, the
New Jersey Supreme Court distinguished the school journal in the
instant case from that in Hazelwood. Id. at 589, 647 A.2d at 152.
Primarily, the court emphasized the appellate division's observation that the community might logically assume that publications
bearing the school's name also carry its seal of approval. Id. Accordingly, because the public was likely to receive the Pioneer Press
as school-endorsed, the court upheld the appellate division's ruling
that the newspaper was not a public forum. Id.
In Part Two of the opinion, the court addressed the sufficiency
of the school board's purported educational concerns justifying exclusion of Brien's reviews. Id. The court first acknowledged that
neither pupils nor instructors relinquish their constitutional right
of free speech when they enter the school yard. Id. (quoting Tinker
v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506). Nevertheless, the court
conceded that expression advanced in a non-public arena may be
subject to reasonable limitations. Id. Recalling Hazelwood, the
court instructed that school authorities do not transgress First
Amendment mandates when they regulate student expression in
school-endorsed publications so long as the censorship bears a rational nexus to legitimate educational interests. Id. at 591, 647
A.2d at 152 (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273). Noting Hazelwoods definition of valid educational interests and examining the
text of Brien's work, the court affirmed that Brien's film critiques
did not warrant censorship. Id., 647 A.2d at 152-53 (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271).
Next, the court considered the types of instructional policy
that could qualify as a legitimate interest warranting censorship of
student-authored film critiques. Id., 647 A.2d at 153. Initially, the
court addressed the appellate division's distinction between the
censorship targets in Hazelwood and those in the instant case. Id. at
591-92, 647 A.2d at 153. The court noted the appellate division's
finding that, unlike Hazelwoods content-based regulation, the in-
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stant editorial conduct was directed solely at quashing the subjectmatter of Brien's review. Id. at 592, 647 A.2d at 153. The court was
unwilling, however, to adopt the appellate division's conclusion
that educational concerns may justify restraints on the form but
not the subject of expression. Id. The court further declined to
accept the proposition that content refers only to linguistics. Id. at
592, 647 A.2d at 153-54. Hazelwood, the court clarified, did not support such an interpretation. Id., 647 A.2d at 153. The court insisted, rather, that the concerns in Hazelwood related to both the
form and the subject-matter of the student pieces. Id. at 592-93,
647 A.2d at 153-54. Nevertheless, the court refused to pursue the
style-subject issue, reasoning that the uncertainty and inconsistency
of the Clearview school policy precluded further analysis of the distinction. Id. at 593, 647 A.2d at 154.
The court next chastised the school board's position regarding the Clearview policy on student published materials. Id. Specifically, the court rejected the board's stance as ambiguous. Id.
First, the court took note of the board's concession that it had no
official provision for "R"-rated film critiques. Id. Second, the court
charged that the application of the purported policy to Brien
Desilets' work was vague. Id. Third, the court dismissed the
school's assertion that Brien's articles violated Clearview policy by
jeopardizing "student health." Id. Finally, the court criticized the
board's sporadic application of the school policy in general. Id.
This assessment, the court clarified, did not signify that the
school had no valid educational concerns or legitimate policy concerning publication of film critiques. Id. Rather, the court explained, the evidence demonstrated that the Clearview policy and
its motivating educational concerns, if they existed, were amorphous and inconsistently implemented. Id. Accordingly, the court
affirmed the appellate division's finding of a First Amendment violation based on the school's failure to present a valid pedagogical
policy that would justify the abridgement of Brien's free expression. Id. at 594, 647 A.2d at 154. Having decided the action on
federal constitutional theory, the court found it unnecessary to
consider Mrs. Desilets' state constitutional claims. Id.
In Part Three of the opinion, which Justices Clifford and Stein
did not join, the court proposed a future course of action for
resolving disputes of the instant nature. Id. Preliminarily, the
court acknowledged the intrinsic difficulties that arise in assessing
pedagogical policies concerning student expression. Id. Such
complexity, the court submitted, warrants the initial use of admin-
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istrative agencies to examine the validity of purported school policies. Id. These agencies, the court explained, possess the authority
to resolve disputes within the limited purview of their regulatory
field, even when those controversies involve consideration of constitutional issues. Id. at 594-96, 647 A.2d at 154 (citations omitted).
The court recalled its traditional sanctioning of administrative
agencies to adjudicate educational disputes that materialize in the
context of constitutional quarrels. Id. at 596, 647 A.2d at 154-55
(quoting Abbott v. Burke, 100 NJ. 269, 300 (1985) (other citations
omitted)). In particular, the court noted its prior determination
that the existence of constitutional claims did not prohibit initial
consideration by an administrative entity. Id. at 597, 647 A.2d at
155 (quoting Abbott, 100 N.J. at 296-97). The court declared that in
the past, administrative review of pedagogical interests was particularly appropriate because the fundamental constitutional questions
were highly fact-sensitive and tied to areas of educational expertise.
Id., 647 A.2d at 156 (quoting Abbott, 100 N.J. at 301).
In the instant matter, the court stressed, the central constitutional inquiry was whether school restrictive policies abrogated a
student's First Amendment rights. Id. The answer, the court proffered, turned on whether those policies bore a reasonable nexus to
valid educational objectives. Id. Because the analysis required to
resolve such an issue undoubtedly demands a high degree of professional and educational skill, the court found the Commissioner
of Education to be the best authority to conduct the initial review
in the future. Id. Thus, based on the foregoing reasons and those
espoused by the court of appeals, the New Jersey Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment of the appellate division. Id.
Justice Pollock, in a concurring and dissenting opinion joined
by Chief Justice Wilentz, agreed with the court's determination
that the Clearview school policy was vague and haphazardly applied. Id. at 598, 647 A.2d at 156 (Pollock, J., concurring and dissenting). Similarly, the justice found that the board's stance was
ambiguous. Id. Justice Pollock charged, however, that the Hazelwood decision compelled greater deference to school officials than
the court afforded. Id. (citing Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270).
The justice first observed that Hazelwood recognized expression that is inappropriate for young audiences as a valid educational concern. Id. (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271). Next,
Justice Pollock instructed that the Rating Board of the Motion Picture Association of America has given an "R" rating to movies that
contain mature subject-matter. Id. (citing JACK VALENTI, MOTION
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PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, THE VOLUNTARY MOVIE RATING

(1994)). Such a rating, the justice explained, requires
adults to chaperon minor viewers and cautions those adults to inquire about the film before permitting minors to view it. Id. (citing
VALENTI, at 9). Therefore, Justice Pollock opined that school authorities may determine that the censorship of "R"-rated film critiques in a student publication bears a reasonable relation to valid
pedagogical interests. Id., 647 A.2d at 157 (Pollock, J., concurring
and dissenting). Accordingly, Justice Pollock submitted that school
authorities may appropriately establish a policy that prohibits the
review of a certain category of movies, even where some of the
films in that classification are found acceptable for critique. Id. at
599, 647 A.2d at 157 (Pollock, J., concurring and dissenting).
Continuing, Justice Pollock examined the educational system.
Id. Analogizing the instruction of young people to an informal
partnership comprised of pupils, parents, administrators, and
school boards, Justice Pollock acknowledged parents' expectation
that school authorities will assume responsibility for their children.
Id. In assuming such an obligation, the justice maintained, instructors are called upon to exercise discretion that may result in impeding pupils' liberty. Id. Therefore, the justice urged that in an
organized, democratic society, there is no constitutional violation
in compelling students to abide by official school policy regarding
publication of film critiques. Id.
Proceeding, Justice Pollock emphasized the vulnerability of
adolescent school children and noted the minimum governmentimposed age requirements on certain rights and privileges. Id.
(Pollock, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 39:3-10 (setting the driving age at 17); 9:17B-lb (setting the
drinking age at 21); 9:17B-lc (setting the age for casino admission
at 21)). Moreover, the justice imagined that school authorities
could formulate an instructional objective in forbidding school
publications of "R"-rated movie reviews. Id. The justice remarked,
however, that such action would prove ineffective in deterring
teenage attendance at mature films. Id.
Lastly, Justice Pollock agreed that the Commissioner of Education could be instrumental in circumventing litigation of the instant kind. Id. at 600, 647 A.2d at 157 (Pollock, J., concurring and
dissenting).
The justice suggested, however, that the Commissioner could
more effectively aid the process by examining local school board
policies to prevent controversies rather than adjudicating them
SYSTEM 9
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once filed. Id. Recognizing the sensitivity inherent in reconciling
constitutional guarantees with school authority, Justice Pollock
proposed that the Commissioner could assist by defining and identifying valid pedagogical concerns. Id. Such action, the justice projected, might avert litigation. Id. Because Justice Pollock agreed
with the court's assessment of the Clearview school policy and the
merits of the Education Commissioner's intervention in similar disputes, the Justice would affirm the appellate division's judgment.
Id.
In an era in which fitness is a growing obsession, litigation itself has become a veritable sport. Court dockets are brimming with
stale and overdue cases as new disputes continue to flood the system. By holding educators to a mere reasonableness standard
when infringing expressional rights in a non-public forum, the
court has recognized the valuable and discretionary role that
schools should play in coaching children for the most challenging
team sport of all-the real world. As the court wisely realized, however, affirming the valid pedagogical interest standard is not
enough. Thus, the court proposed to tackle runaway litigation by
passing the adjudicatory ball to an administrative agency. Though
an administrative entity is surely well-equipped to referee confrontations like the one involved here, the interests of all players would
be better served by quashing the fights before they break out. By
articulating what qualifies as a legitimate educational concern and
reviewing school policies, the Commissioner of Education can
coach educators toward a winning season in the classroom, instead
of the courtroom.
A school's objective is to educate, not litigate. By nipping the
constitutional disputes in the bud before they escalate into courtroom quarrels, schools will be free to properly spend tax dollars
teaching our children instead of defending avoidable and needless
law suits. Justice Pollock's insightful suggestion is a welcome move
toward refocusing educators' attention toward academics and relieving court dockets everywhere.
Amy S. Cleghorn
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-REMovAL OF JURORS-A JUDGE MAY
DISCHARGE A JUROR AS "UNABLE TO CONTINUE" ONLY IF THERE

EXISTS ADEQUATE SUPPORT IN THE RECORD THAT SHE IS UNABLE TO FUNCTION BECAUSE OF REASONS NOT RELATED TO HER

INTERACTION WITH FELLOW JURORS-State v. Valenzuela, 136

N.J. 458, 643 A.2d 582 (1994).
In State v. Valenzuela, while deliberating on whether defendant
Raphael Valenzuela was guilty of sexual assault, the jury informed
the court that one of its members did not want to continue as a
juror. 136 N.J. at 462, 643 A.2d at 584. Upon questioning by the
presiding judge, the juror, Miss Pollack, indicated that, although
she understood the jury's function and was able to perform it, she
felt pressure from the other jurors concerning her differing opinions and believed that the others did not want her on the jury. Id.
at 462-63, 464, 643 A.2d at 584-85. After this questioning, the
judge decided that Miss Pollack was competent to remain on the
jury, and directed the jury to continue deliberations. Id. at 464,
643 A.2d at 585.
Less than one half-hour later, the court received another note
from the jury requesting that an alternate juror be appointed. The
note stated that Miss Pollack did not understand the deliberative
process and was incapable of expressing herself. Again, the judge
separately questioned Miss Pollack, who then admitted that she felt
the other jurors disagreed with her opinions and that she feared
she would cause a mistrial. Id. at 464-65, 643 A.2d at 585.
As a consequence of observing Miss Pollock's peculiar behavior and erratic responses to questioning, the judge determined that
Miss Pollack was "somewhat[ ] bizarre," not able to discuss the case
with the other jurors in an intelligent fashion, and unable to do
her job as a juror. Id. at 466, 643 A.2d at 586. Over the defendant's objection, the court discharged the juror pursuant to Rule
1:8-2(d). The judge then directed an alternate juror, who had
been present throughout the entire trial proceeding, to sit as a substitute in deliberations that would start anew. In less than an hour,
the newly-composed jury found Valenzuela guilty of sexual assault.
The appellate division reviewed the trial court's decision to excuse the juror and found that because the juror was not clearly
unable to continue, the court erred in dismissing her. Id. at 46667, 643 A.2d at 586. The appellate division reversed the conviction
and remanded the case to the superior court for a new trial. Id. at
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467, 643 A.2d at 586. Valenzuela then appealed to the New Jersey
Supreme Court. Id. at 461, 643 A.2d at 583.
The supreme court affirmed the appellate court's decision to
overturn Valenzuela's conviction, holding that a trial judge may
not discharge a juror under Rule 1:8-2(d) unless the record clearly
indicates that she is unable to function as a jury member for personal reasons other than her interaction in deliberations with the
other jurors. Id. at 472-73, 643 A.2d at 588-90. Justice Stein, writing for a unanimous court, began the analysis by reviewing the text
of procedural Rule 1:8-2(d), which states the following: "if at any
time after the submission of the case to a jury, a juror dies or a
juror is discharged by the court because he is ill or otherwise unable to continue, the court may... [remove her and select a substitute juror]." Id. at 467, 643 A.2d at 586-87 (quoting R. 1:8-2(d)).
Justice Stein recognized that this rule attempts to balance equitably two important competing interests: society's need for judicial economy and the accused individual's right to a fair jury trial.
Id., 643 A.2d at 587 (citing State v. Trent, 157 N.J. Super. 231, 23839, 384 A.2d 888 (App. Div. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 79 N.J.
251, 398 A.2d 1271 (1979)). The court observed that before the
current version of Rule 1:8-2 (d), courts would dismiss alternate jurors upon commencement of the jury deliberation stage. Id. (citing Report of Supreme Court Committee on Criminal Procedure, 95
N.J.L.J. 341, 356 (Apr. 13, 1972)). The justice explained that when
a juror became ill or otherwise unable to discharge her duties during this stage, absent both parties' agreement to allow a smaller
jury's resolution to be binding, such circumstances forced a court
to declare a mistrial. Id. Hence, Justice Stein noted that the
Supreme Court of New Jersey amended Rule 1:8-2(d) to keep the
alternatejurors available until deliberations end, making juror substitution possible at any time that a juror is unable to perform her
duties conscientiously. Id.
Justice Stein cautioned, however, that courts should simultaneously look to protect a defendant's constitutional rights. Id. at 46768, 643 A.2d at 587 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI; N.J. CONST. art.
I,
9) (other citations omitted). The justice noted that the
supreme court previously held that Rule 1:8-2(d) does not facially
intrude upon the constitutional right of a criminal defendant to a
trial by a fair and impartial jury. Id. at 468, 643 A.2d at 587. The
justice suggested, however, that ajudge's use of the rule would violate this right if it substantively affected the ensuing deliberation
process. Id.
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The court observed that the text of the rule limits its scope to
death, illness, or other inability to continue, and asserted that the
rule applies only to situations of a personal nature that do not tend
to prejudice the jury's deliberative process. Id. (quoting Trent, 157
N.J. Super. at 239, 384 A.2d 888) (other citation omitted). To best
safeguard against violating the defendant's rights and to maintain
the integrity of court procedure, the justice urged trial judges to
apply the rule with extreme caution, and only as a last effort to
avoid the waste of judicial resources caused by a mistrial. Id. (citations omitted). The court thus concluded that judges should not
be able to discharge a juror simply because she cannot bring herself to agree with the otherjurors' conclusions, causing the prolongation of deliberations and possibly forcing a mistrial. Id. at 46869, 643 A.2d at 587 (citations omitted).
The court recognized, however, that ajuror's mental state can
govern whether she is competent to fulfill her jury obligations. Id.
at 470, 643 A.2d at 588. The court noted that the trial judge in
State v. Miller properly dismissed a juror who, plagued by a nervous
and emotional condition, felt that he could not make an objective
decision about the case. Id. (citing State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392, 40102, 388 A.2d 218 (1978)). Justice Stein stated that the Miller decision recognized that Rule 1:8-2(d) vests a trial judge with discretionary powers of dismissal, but the justice noted that Miller
simultaneously urged judges to be prudent when exercising that
power. Id. (quoting Miller, 76 N.J. at 407, 388 A.2d 218).
Although acknowledging that the trial court based the decision to dismiss Miss Pollack on both the jury's second note and its
own observations of the juror's demeanor in the courtroom, Justice
Stein nonetheless repudiated the trial judge's decision by arguing
that there was insufficient evidence to suggest that Miss Pollack was
incompetent. Id. at 470-71, 643 A.2d at 588-89. In holding that the
trial judge did not exercise proper discretion in dismissing the juror, Justice Stein elaborated that Miss Pollack never stated that she
was incapable of making an individual decision or that she would
simply defer to her fellow jurors. Id. at 471-72, 643 A.2d at 589.
Indeed, the justice noted, the trial record indicated that the reason
Miss Pollack did not wish to participate was at least partially based
on her interactions with the other jury members, which is an improper basis for exclusion. Id. Justice Stein instructed that only
exclusively personal and compelling circumstances, which may introduce outside influences that could cause a prejudicial impact on
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the integrity of the deliberation process, should be grounds for juror removal. Id. at 472-73, 643 A.2d at 589.
Justice Stein stressed the importance of a clear trial record
containing incidents and statements that support a judge's decision to exclude a juror. Id. at 472, 643 A.2d 589. Because such
clarity did not exist in the record, and because there was evidence
that suggested that the juror's puzzlement stemmed from her reaction to the other jurors, the court concluded that by discharging
the juror the trial court improperly exercised discretion granted
under Rule 1:8-2(d). Id. Justice Stein then charted an appropriate
course for trial judges to take when there is continuing disagreement among the jurors over a proper verdict. Id. at 473, 643 A.2d
at 589-90. First, the court explained that in such an instance, a
judge must inquire whether a unanimous verdict is likely upon further deliberation. Id., 643 A.2d at 590. The court next stated that
if juror disagreement continues to the extent that it is clearly unresolvable, the judge should declare a mistrial. Id.
Due to the court's holding that the trial judge erred in dismissing Miss Pollack, Justice Stein recognized that there was no
need to decide whether the jury deliberations had actually
progressed too far for juror substitution to be permissible or
whether the court's procedure for selecting an alternate juror was
proper. Id. The court, however, offered some guidance as to the
rule of law on those issues. Id. Justice Stein first counseled that the
substitution of an alternate juror after extensive jury deliberations
may prejudice a defendant accused of a crime. Id. at 473-74, 643
A.2d at 590 (citations omitted). Although procedural rules require
the reconstituted jury to begin deliberating de novo when the
court adds a new juror, the justice acknowledged that any progress
made by the original jury may inevitably influence the newjury. Id.
at 475, 643 A.2d at 591 (quoting State v. Corsaro, 107 N.J. 339, 351,
526 A.2d 1046 (1987)). Furthermore, the supreme court, although
declining to state whether the trial court's alternate selection process prejudiced defendant's trial, emphasized that trial courts
should follow the steps prescribed by Rule 1:8-2(d) to ensure that
the procedure does not give the appearance that the court unfairly
designated a particular alternate to sit on the jury. Id.
The supreme court properly clarified the bounds of a trial
judge's discretion to remove a juror under Rule 1:8-2(d). Emphasizing the fundamental nature of an accused person's right to receive fair treatment within the criminal justice system, the court
clarified that ajudge's decision to exclude ajuror should be closely
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scrutinized when such exclusion is even partially based on that juror's refusal to yield to external influences. Thus, the standards by
which a court may examine a juror's competence during the jury
deliberation process are significant. Clearly, a dissenting juror who
does not want to cause friction should not be able to transfer the
responsibility of making a decision to an alternate simply by claiming incompetence.
Although a juror's mental condition can provide a court with
a proper basis for dismissal, evidence that suggests an uncomfortable relationship among members of the jury should alert ajudge to
probe more deeply into the juror's motivations. As long as ajuror
is able to understand and impartially carry out her function as the
trier of fact, the other jurors should not be able to petition for her
removal. Allowing a judge to dismiss a competent juror when the
juror is not convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt would erode a criminal defendant's right to a unanimous
verdict by a complete jury. If the jury cannot come to a unanimous
verdict, the court, absent agreement by the parties, must grant a
mistrial. This demonstrates the importance of procedural rules
that extinguish a trial judge's discretion to undermine a criminal
defendant's rights for a smoother judicial process.
In many instances a mistrial effectuates a comprehensive retrial, and often results in a substantial waste of judicial resources.
Justice dictates that rules of criminal procedure permit judges to
abate such excess through equitable alternatives. Devoid of such
alternatives, a court may prematurely dismiss a juror in the minority just to avoid a mistrial. Now that the supreme court has clarified what is acceptable procedure, trial judges will likely be more
prudent about dismissing a juror and will also be encouraged to
keep detailed records about any questionable juror.
David R. Crittenden
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TORTS-STANDARD OF CARE - PARTICIPANTS IN INFORMAL SPORTS
HAvE A DuTy OF CARE NOT To ENGAGE IN RECKLESS OR INTENTIONAL CONDUCT THAT CAUSES HARMr-Crawn v. Campo, 136
NJ. 494, 643 A.2d 600 (1994).
On May 1, 1988, the plaintiff, Michael Crawn, and the defendant, John Campo, participated in a weekly informal softball game.
136 NJ. at 496-97, 643 A.2d at 601-02. While playing the position
of catcher, Crawn injured his leg during a play in which Campo, a
base runner, attempted to score from second base. Id. at 498, 643
A.2d at 602. The plaintiff testified that he had positioned himself
to the right of home plate, with his left foot on the right portion of
the plate, facing first base. The plaintiff contended that the defendant deliberately and unnecessarily slid into him in order to
avoid being tagged out. Presenting conflicting testimony, the defendant stated that as he approached the plate, the plaintiff stood
with one foot on each side of home plate. The defendant further
argued that the plaintiffs position made it necessary for the defendant to slide, feet first, into home plate in order to score. When
the players collided, the plaintiff tore a knee ligament. Id. at 49899, 643 A.2d at 602. The parties also presented conflicting testimony as to whether and to what extent the softball players observed a no-slide rule. Id. at 497-98, 643 A.2d at 602.
The plaintiff brought suit, alleging that the defendant acted
negligently, recklessly, or intentionally and was thus liable for the
plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 499, 643 A.2d at 602. The trial court determined that participants in recreational sports have a duty not to
engage recklessly or intentionally in injurious conduct. Id. at 497,
643 A.2d at 601 (citing Crawn v. Campo, 257 N.J. Super. 374, 608
A.2d 465 (Law Div. 1992)). The trial court also concluded that
expert testimony was not necessary to establish the applicable standard of care. Id. at 499, 643 A.2d at 602. Deliberating on the issue
of liability, the jury determined that the defendant acted recklessly
and was therefore liable for the plaintiffs injuries. Id. The trial
court granted the defendant's motion for a new trial, finding that
justice had been denied as a result of the cumulative effect of several evidentiary rulings made by the court. Id. at 499, 510, 643
A.2d at 602, 608.
On appeal from both parties, the New Jersey Superior Court,
Appellate Division, affirmed the trial court's ruling in part and reversed in part. Id. at 499, 643 A.2d at 602 (citation omitted). The
appellate division affirmed that expert testimony was unnecessary
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in this context and ruled that the trial court had not abused its
discretion in granting a new trial. Id. at 499, 512, 643 A.2d at 602,
609. Addressing the standard of care issue, however, the appellate
division reversed the trial court holding that participants in informal sporting events have a duty only to act reasonably under the
circumstances. Id. at 499, 643 A.2d at 602-03. Both parties made
motions for leave to appeal the judgment. Id., 643 A.2d at 603.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted both motions to resolve the conflict concerning the standard of care governing the
conduct of participants in informal, recreational sports. Id. at 497,
499, 643 A.2d at 601, 603 (citing Crawn v. Campo, 134 N.J. 557, 636
A.2d 516 (1993)). Although agreeing that the trial court properly
exercised its discretion in granting a new trial and that expert testimony was not required, the supreme court disagreed with the ordinary negligence standard adopted by the appellate division. Id. at
503, 508, 512, 643 A.2d at 605, 607, 609. Imposing a heightened
standard of care, the supreme court held that persons engaging in
informal sports have a duty to avoid injurious conduct which is
reckless or intentional. Id. at 497, 508, 643 A.2d at 601, 607.
Writing for an unanimous court, Justice Handler began the
court's analysis by reviewing other jurisdictions' treatment of this
issue. Id. at 499, 643 A.2d at 603. The court stated that a majority
ofjurisdictions hold that an informal sports participant is not liable
for injuries unless the player has acted recklessly or intentionally.
Id. at 499-500, 643 A.2d at 603 (citations omitted). The court
noted three reasons set forth by other courts tojustify the recklessness standard. Id. First, the justice observed that other jurisdictions find the recklessness standard appropriate because the risk of
injury is an inherent characteristic of many informal sports. Id. at
500-01, 643 A.2d at 603-04 (citations omitted). Second, the court
remarked that these jurisdictions assert that the recklessness standard encourages vigorous participation in sports. Id. at 501, 643
A.2d at 604. Finally, the court noted that other jurisdictions maintain that the recklessness standard avoids the massive amount of
litigation an ordinary negligence standard would likely generate.
Id.
Justice Handler next explained that by imposing a duty of care
prohibiting only reckless and intentional conduct, the court was
implicitly immunizing negligent conduct which normally would be
actionable. Id. at 502, 643 A.2d at 604. While acknowledging that
NewJersey is strongly adverse to immunizing tortious conduct, the
court maintained that public policy justified the heightened stan-
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dard of care in this instance. Id. In the informal sports setting, the
court elucidated, considerations of fairness, public policy, the relationship between the parties, and the risk involved supported the
imposition of a reckless or intentional harm standard of care. Id.
at 503, 643 A.2d at 604-05.
The court presented two public policy arguments favoring the
partial immunization of otherwise tortious conduct in the recreational sports context. Id. at 503-04, 643 A.2d at 605. First, the
court emphasized that society should encourage participation in
informal sports, which are important and popular social activities.
Id. Limiting liability to harm resulting from reckless or intentional
conduct, the court opined, promoted this goal. Id. Second, the
court argued that legislation granting partial immunity in certain
sports settings indicated a public policy which supported the creation of a common law immunity as well. Id. at 504, 643 A.2d at 605
(citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:62A-6, 2A:62A-6.1).
The court then focused on the relationships and risks involved
in informal, recreational sporting activities. Id. at 504-06, 643 A.2d
at 605-06. The court commented that a certain amount of physical
contact and emotional intensity inhere in many sports. Id. at 504,
643 A.2d at 605. Furthermore, the court noted that individual expectations respecting the amount of contact and the level of intensity vary enormously from one sport and one game to the next. Id.
at 504, 643 A.2d at 605. The court posited that the limitless variations of individual expectations, rules, and conventions in operation during a specific game make it virtually impossible to establish
an objective, reasonable person standard of care. Id. at 507-08, 643
A.2d at 606-07. Given the court's unwillingness to define reasonableness in this context, the court proclaimed that the recklessness
standard was therefore appropriate. Id. at 508, 643 A.2d at 607.
This standard, the court proffered, properly balanced the desire to
encourage sports participation and the need to sanction clearly inappropriate behavior. Id.
Finally, Justice Handler addressed the issue of whether expert
testimony was necessary to determine the proper standard of care
in a sports related injury case. Id. The court explained that expert
testimony assisted a jury in understanding a case when the expert
possessed knowledge or experience not possessed by the average
juror. Id. at 508-09, 643 A.2d at 607 (citation omitted). Because
each informal game tends to be played according to its own unique
set of rules, the court stated, a general sports expert would offer
little aid to ajury deliberating about a particular game. Id. at 509-
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10, 643 A.2d at 608 (citation omitted). Consequently, the court
declared that the average juror, drawing on society's general familiarity with sports, could sufficiently comprehend the rules of a particular game and determine what constituted recklessness under
the circumstances without expert testimony. Id. at 510, 643 A.2d at

608.
The New Jersey Supreme Court correctly decided to hold participants in informal sporting events to a recklessness standard of
care. By design, recreational games are loosely organized and unstructured. In situations where players vary from game to game
and rules are not explicitly defined, conduct acceptable in one
game could easily be considered unreasonable in the next. An ordinary negligence standard would be nearly impossible to administer in this setting because of the difficulty involved in forming an
objectively reasonable standard from various players' subjective understanding of acceptable behavior. Consequently, courts should
not hold a player liable unless the person has recklessly disregarded the risk his conduct has created for the other participants.
Robyn A. Kowantz

NEGLIGENCE-PUBLIC

UTILITY LIABILITY-As

LONG AS

PUBLIC

UTILITIES LOCATE UTILITY POLES IN ACCORDANCE WITH PUBLIC
BODIES' MANDATE, PUBLIC UTILITIES HAVE No FURTHER OBLIGATION TO SAFEGUARD THE MOTORING PUBLIC-Contey

v. New

Jersey Bell Telephone Co., 136 N.J. 582, 643 A.2d 1005 (1994).
While driving on an unfamiliar road in Franklin Lakes, plaintiff, Althea Contey, missed an unmarked curve and collided with a
utility pole. Id. at 583, 643 A.2d at 1006. The pole, which was located just before an S-curve in the road, stood approximately ten
inches from the curb. To motorists driving along the road, it appeared as if the pole was in the middle of the street. Contey was
injured in the accident and subsequently sued the Rockland Electric Company, New Jersey Bell Telephone Company, the Borough
of Franklin Lakes, Bergen County, and the State of New Jersey.
Contey eventually settled or voluntarily dismissed all claims

against the public bodies. Id. at 584, 643 A.2d at 1006. The trial
court granted the utilities' motion for summary judgment. Id. Re-

1994]

SURVEY

843

lying on the holding in Oram v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. that a
utility is not liable for the placement of poles when a motorist departs from the traveled portion of a highway, the NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed in an unreported opinion.
Id. (citing Oram v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 132 N.J. Super. 491, 334
A.2d 343 (App. Div. 1975)). The plaintiff appealed as of right to
the New Jersey Supreme Court. Id. (citation omitted).
The supreme court affirmed, holding that when a public utility places its poles in accordance with the public body's instructions, the utility has no further obligation to protect motorists. Id.
at 591, 643 A.2d at 1010. The court concluded that primary responsibility for the motoring public's safety should be placed with
the public bodies who control, own, and maintain the highways.
Id. at 590, 643 A.2d at 1009.
Justice O'Hern, writing for the majority, observed that resolution of the case required the court to reconsider the limits of proximate cause and legal duty. Id. at 583, 643 A.2d at 1006. Thejustice
noted that courts in both Florida and Pennsylvania have found that
public utilities may be liable when motorists leave the traveled section of the highway and collide with negligently placed or maintained utility poles. Id. at 584-85, 643 A.2d at 1007 (citations
omitted). In contrast, the court observed, the Michigan Supreme
Court rejected the argument that a public utility does not owe a
duty to a passenger of a vehicle that strays from the traveled portion of the road. Id. at 585, 643 A.2d at 1007 (citing McMillan v.
Michigan State Highway Comm'n, 393 N.W.2d 332 (Mich. 1986)).
Analyzing the early common law, Justice O'Hern enunciated
that previous cases acknowledged that it was foreseeable for a vehicle to depart from a paved street and collide with a utility pole. Id.
The justice recounted that in Hoyt v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co.,
the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals declared that because
wayward vehicles are likely to strike utility poles, public utilities
must exercise "'reasonably careful judgment'" in designing and
maintaining such poles. Id. at 585-86, 643 A.2d at 1007 (quoting
Hoyt v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 117 N.J.L. 106, 109, 187 A. 43 (E.
& A. 1936)).
In contrast to these earlier cases, the court explained that in
Oram, the appellate division concluded that the placement of a utility pole could not have been the proximate cause of an injury that
occurred when a vehicle departed from the traveled portion of the
road. Id. at 586, 643 A.2d at 1007 (citation omitted). Instead, Justice O'Hern elaborated, the appellate division held that public util-
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ities must only anticipate ordinary travel that contemplates a
vehicle being driven on the highway. Id. (quoting Oram, 132 N.J.
Super. at 494, 334 A.2d 343).
Justice O'Hern speculated that this difference between New
Jersey's earlier and later case law may be attributed to the fact that
today public bodies pave highways and install curbs. Id. The
supreme court questioned, however, whether such a development
should alter the court's legal analysis. Id. In answering the question of whether the highway consists of the paved area or the area
within the curbs, Justice O'Hern noted that the appellate division
recently declared that a public body has a duty to repair more than
the traveled portion of a highway. Id., 643 A.2d at 1008 (citing
Furey v. County of Ocean, 273 N.J. Super. 300, 641 A.2d 1041 (App.
Div. 1994)).
Evaluating statistics from the United States Department of
Transportation, Justice O'Hern reported that approximately 1500
people die each year in collisions with utility poles. Id. at 587, 643
A.2d at 1008 (citation omitted). Additionally, the justice stated,
every year roughly 65,000 injuries are sustained when vehicles
strike utility poles. Id. The court observed that the Federal Highway Administration has researched measures to alleviate accidents
between vehicles and utility poles. Id.
Thus, Justice O'Hern concluded, because the risk of injury is
great, so too is the public's interest in reducing that risk. Id. at 588,
643 A.2d at 1009. The supreme court declared that highway engineers and the public bodies who employ them should shoulder primary responsibility for the safety of motorists. Id. In support of
this conclusion, Justice O'Hern cited two New Jersey statutes. Id.
(citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 48:17-8; 48:17-11). Specifically, the justice noted, NewJersey Statutes Annotated § 48:17-11 requires public utilities to comply with local ordinances and resolutions that
designate the location of utility poles. Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN.
48:17-11). The court observed that in this case, the Borough of
Franklin Lakes had adopted an ordinance that regulated the location of utility poles. Id. at 589, 643 A.2d at 1009 (citation omitted).
Justice O'Hern posited that because the ordinance did not require
the borough to measure the safety of a pole's location, the borough may be unable to avail itself of the immunity to which it
would normally be entitled in designing public thoroughfares. Id.
The court, reiterated that those who control, own, and maintain the roadways should be responsible to the motoring public.
Id. at 590, 643 A.2d at 1009. Justice O'Hern opined that although
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public utilities are obligated to foresee that vehicles will stray from
the traveled section of the roadway, public bodies and their highway planners are in the best position to determine how the utilities
should discharge this duty. Id., 643 A.2d at 1009-10.
Justice O'Hern remarked that one does not need an engineering degree to foresee that a motorist might stray from an unmarked curve in the street and collide with the adjacent utility
pole. Id., 643 A.2d at 1010. Thejustice admitted that the court was
tempted to hold the utility companies liable in light of the fact that
at least two other motorists had collided with the pole in question.
Id. Despite this fact, however, the court concluded that highway
planners are in the best position to regulate the location and design of poles located near public thoroughfares. Id.
The supreme court asserted that placing responsibility for
highway safety on public bodies would achieve a uniform standard
of care. Id. at 591, 643 A.2d at 1010. Thus, Justice O'Hern concluded, as long as public utilities locate utility poles in accordance
with the public body's instructions, the utilities should have no additional responsibility to safeguard the motoring public. Id. Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the appellate division's
decision in favor of the public utilities. Id.
Claiming that the majority accorded public utilities unwarranted immunity, Justice Handler dissented in "this rather ordinary
negligence case.". Id. (Handler,J., dissenting). The justice praised
the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in McMillan v. Michigan State Highway Commission. Id. at 592-93, 643 A.2d at 1010-11
(Handler, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). The dissent contended that in determining whether a public utility has breached
its duty of care to the motoring public, a court may consider the
existence of any relevant municipal ordinances. Id. at 593, 643
A.2d at 1011 (Handler, J., dissenting). Justice Handler asserted,
however, that such an ordinance is not dispositive in insulating a
public utility from liability. Id.
The dissent agreed with the majority's observation that governmental bodies have the right to designate the location of utility
poles. Id. (citation omitted). Justice Handler disagreed, however,
that such governmental involvement could shield public utilities of
all liability in the placement of utility poles. Id. at 594, 643 A.2d at
1011 (Handler, J., dissenting). The justice maintained that there
was no evidence to suggest that the legislature intended utilities to
be exonerated of all responsibility in the location of utility poles.
Id. Accordingly, Justice Handler indicated that he would have re-
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versed the law division's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
utilities, and permitted the plaintiff to prove her negligence claim.
Id., 643 A.2d at 1012 (Handler, J., dissenting).
For reasons that are not entirely clear, the New Jersey
Supreme Court has chosen to bestow public utilities with virtually
absolute immunity in the placement of utility poles. While acknowledging that utilities "have a duty to foresee that motorists will
leave the traveled portion of the highway," the court nonetheless
places all responsibility for motorists' safety on public entities. See
id. at 590, 643 A.2d at 1009-10. This conclusion is both illogical
and untenable. The government plays a significant role in determining the placement of utility poles. It does not follow, however,
that this governmental involvement should exonerate public utilities from all responsibility. See id. at 594, 643 A.2d at 1011 (Handler, J., dissenting).
In addition, the court's holding will often preclude recovery
for motorists who are injured in collisions with utility poles. As the
supreme court acknowledged, a public entity will often be able to
invoke the protection of the Tort Claims Act. See id. at 591, 643
A.2d at 1010. Thus, the public entity, and now the public utility,
may be completely relieved of responsibility for the placement of
utility poles. Neither public bodies nor public utilities should be
liable every time a motorist collides with a utility pole. If either
entity is negligent in the placement of such poles, however, it
should be held accountable for its failure to exercise due care.
J Paige Lambdin

TORTS-BYSTANDER

LIABILITY-A JURY QUESTION

EXISTS AS TO

WHETHER AN UNMARRIED COHABITANT SHOULD BE AFFORDED

THE PROTECTION OF BYSTANDER LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DIsTREss-Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J.

99, 642 A.2d 372 (1994).
On September 29, 1992, while attempting to change the tire
of a friend's car on the shoulder of a highway, Michael T. Burwell
was hit by James Gregor's car. Id. at 102, 642 A.2d at 373. Burwell
died the next day, as a consequence of his injuries. Burwell had
been engaged to, and was living with, plaintiff Eileen Dunphy,
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prior to the accident. Dunphy was approximately five feet away
from Burwell when he was hit by Gregor's car. As a result of witnessing the accident, Dunphy became depressed and anxious, and
sought psychological and psychiatric treatment.
Dunphy instituted suit against Gregor for negligent infliction
of emotional distress. At her deposition she testified that she and
Burwell had been financially dependent upon each other, and that
on several occasions Burwell introduced her as his wife.
The trial court analyzed whether bystander liability should
permit recovery for emotional injuries suffered by a person who
was engaged to be married and cohabitated with the decedent. Id.
at 101, 642 A.2d at 373. The court held that such an action was not
available to a person who was neither involved in an intimate, familial relationship nor married to the decedent. Id.
In contrast, the appellate division held that a jury should determine whether the relationship of a couple cohabitating and engaged to be married is the same as an intimate, familial
relationship. Id. (citing Dunphy v. Gregor, 261 NJ. Super. 110, 617
A.2d 1248 (App. Div. 1992)). The dissenting opinion in the appellate division propounded that such a cause of action could only be
maintained by persons who were legally married. Id. (citing
Dunphy, 261 N.J. Super. at 125, 617 A.2d 1248).
The plaintiff appealed as of right due to the dissenting opinion in the Appellate Division. Id. at 102, 642 A.2d at 373 (citation
omitted). The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the appellate
division's judgment, holding that a couple that is engaged and
cohabitating should be allowed to maintain a cause of action under
bystander liability for the negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Id. at 115, 642 A.2d at 380.
Writing for the majority, Justice Handler began by analyzing
Portee v. Jaffee, the first New Jersey case in which the supreme court
allowed a bystander to recover for the negligent infliction of emotional distress suffered from witnessing the wrongful death of another. Id. at 102-03, 642 A.2d at 373 (citing Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J.
88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980)). Justice Handler explained that the Portee
court adopted a four-pronged test for establishing negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 103, 642 A.2d at 374 (citation
omitted). At issue in this appeal, the justice emphasized, was the
second prong which requires a bystander-claimant to demonstrate
a marital or intimate, familial relationship between the bystander
and the injured person. Id.
The majority elucidated that in Portee the existence of the sec-
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ond prong, that is, a marital or intimate, familial relationship between the plaintiff and the injured person was particularly
important as the basis of recovery. Id. at 103-04, 642 A.2d at 374.
Continuing, the majority maintained that the presence of an intimate, deep, familial relationship between the bystander and the
victim is what makes the trauma to emotional tranquility so compelling and serious. Id. at 104, 642 A.2d at 374. The acute and
genuine suffering, the majority underscored, contrasts starkly to
the everyday vicissitudes, setbacks, and sorrows one inevitably encounters, or even to the consternation of harm to another less intimate individual. Id. (citation omitted).
Justice Handler acknowledged the two distinct interpretations
of the second prong of the Portee test that separated the majority
and the dissent in the appellate division. Id. (citation omitted).
The majority, the justice asserted, understood Porteeto include relationships that are functionally equivalent to family. Id. (citing
Dunphy, 261 N.J. Super. at 123-24, 617 A.2d 1248). Whereas the
dissent, the justice stated, interpreted the requisite familial relationship as being restricted to blood ties or marriage. Id. (citing
Dunphy, 261 N.J. Super. at 125, 617 A.2d 1248) (Muir, J.A.D., dissenting)). Justice Handler rejected the notion that the majority
should follow the lead of the California courts in refusing to extend bystander liability to cohabitating couples. Id. at 106, 642
A.2d at 375. Instead, the justice asserted that whether a claimant is
owed such a duty of care is a matter of fairness. Id. at 108, 642 A.2d
at 376 (citation omitted).
The justice concluded that persons who are engaged and living together may foreseeably suffer the same intense emotional distress as do persons who share an intimate, familial relationship. Id.
at 109-10, 642 A.2d at 377. Because unmarried cohabitation has
become widespread and generally accepted, the justice contended,
a reasonable person would not find such a bystander's emotional
trauma to be unexpected and remote. Id. at 110, 642 A.2d at 377
(citation omitted). Moreover, Justice Handler asserted that no additional burden would be placed on potential tortfeasors because,
as in this case, the very act of reasonable care that would have
averted the accident that killed Burwell would have saved the emotional security of Dunphy. Id. Consequently, Justice Handler declared that the extension of the duty of care to an engaged
cohabitant, as a protectable and foreseeable person, does not augment the burden of care beyond what is already expected and appropriate for reasonable drivers. Id. (citation omitted).
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Therefore, the justice concluded that the standard was both workable and fair. Id. at 110-11, 642 A.2d at 377 (citation omitted).
The majority thought that determining whether a relationship
rises to the level of being intimate and familial should be a jury
question based on the facts, regardless of the de jure relationship.
Id., 642 A.2d at 378. The defendant, the majority surmised, may
attack a cause of action for bystander emotional distress if the operative facts manifest that the couple's relationship is estranged or
somehow insufficiently intimate to adequately evidence intense
emotional distress. Id. at 112, 642 A.2d at 378 (citation omitted).
The majority insisted that an appropriate standard should take into
account the length of the relationship, the extent of mutual dependence, and the quality of experiences shared together. Id. Additionally, the majority asserted that this standard should also inquire
into whether the bystander and the injured person lived in the
same household, the specifics of their day to day relationship, and
how they related to each other in attending to life's mundane necessities. Id. (citation omitted).
Addressing concerns raised by the California Supreme Court,
the majority first rejected the notion that without a bright line definition of the relationship between the bystander and the victim,
courts will be unable to counteract meretricious and fraudulent
claims. Id. That concern, the majority countered, fails to outweigh the obligation to recognize legitimate and just claims. Id.
The majority also argued that the California court's belief that
such a cause of action would intrude on the privacy of an unmarried couple was meritless because the same concern would be present if the couple were married. Id. at 113, 642 A.2d at 378-79.
Finally, the majority repudiated the California court's argument
that allowing unmarried cohabitants to recover under bystander liability would subvert the state's interest in promoting marriage. Id.
at 113, 642 A.2d at 379. Justice Handler contended that marriage
will still have preferred status under the law. Id. In addition, the
court noted that couples who choose not to marry will, most likely,
not be induced to do so in order to assure legal standing in the
event that one might witness the death or serious injury of his or
her spouse. Id. (citation omitted).
Confronting two additional arguments against extending the
definition of bystander liability to include unmarried cohabitants,
Justice Handler chided the defendant for arguing unpersuasively,
and without supporting empirical evidence, that automobile insurance premiums will increase if Dunphy is allowed to recover under
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bystander liability. Id. at 114, 642 A.2d at 379. Furthermore, the
majority disagreed with the concern that such an application of
bystander liability would unduly expand tort liability. Id.
Affirming the judgment of the appellate division, the majority
concluded that an unmarried, cohabitating couple should be allowed to recover for the negligent infliction of emotional distress
under bystander liability. Id. at 115, 642 A.2d at 380. The majority
propounded that the requisite intimate, familial relationship between the victim and the plaintiff was satisfied. Id.
Justice Garibaldi, in a dissenting opinion, agreed with the majority's assumption that an unmarried cohabitant may suffer emotional distress due to the negligent death of her companion equal
to that of a married person. Id. at 116, 642 A.2d at 380 (Garibaldi,
J., dissenting). The justice, however, argued that the majority's decision insufficiently limited the category of persons who qualify as
an intimate, familial relation. Id. The justice claimed that the
existence of strong emotional ties should not end an examination
of whether the emotional ties are sufficient to establish severe emotional distress. Id.
Justice Garibaldi stressed that the Portee court recognized that
the category of persons who could recover for bystander liability
must be limited. Id. (citation omitted). For this reason, the justice
contended, the Portee court set forth a four-prong test in order to
determine when a bystander could prevail. Id. (citation omitted).
Justice Garibaldi upbraided the majority's decision to expand the
intimate, familial relationship, remonstrating that it will substantially expand the number of people who seek to recover under the
tort of bystander liability. Id. at 117, 642 A.2d at 380-81 (Garibaldi,
J., dissenting).
Justice Garibaldi recognized the majority's view that excluding
unmarried cohabitants from the class of plaintiffs eligible for bystander liability is arbitrary line-drawing. Id., 642 A.2d. at 381 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The justice countered, however, that a
certain degree of arbitrariness is inevitable and necessary in determining the boundaries of tort liability in general, and particularly
with regard to emotional distress. Id. Indeed, Justice Garibaldi
propounded, even the Portee decision drew arbitrary lines in requiring plaintiffs to be actual bystanders to the injury or death of another. Id. The justice articulated that irrespective of where the
line is drawn, an argument can always be made that a bystander
outside this line should reasonably be included. Id. at 119, 642
A.2d at 381-82 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Moreover, Justice Gari-
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baldi articulated that drawing the line at matrimony conforms to
general societal expectations, as indicated in the distinctions between the treatment of married couples and unmarried cohabitants in New Jersey statutes and other areas of the law. Id. at 12021, 642 A.2d at 382-83 (citations omitted) (Garibaldi, J.,
dissenting).
Finally, Justice Garibaldi posited that the open-ended standard
articulated by the majority will force courts to intrude into the private lives of couples. Id. at 122-23, 642 A.2d at 383-84 (citation
omitted) (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Because of the need to draw a
bright line in the area of bystander liability, coupled with the onerous and expensive chore of proving which relationship satisfies the
majority's standards, Justice Garibaldi concluded that the appellate
division's judgment should be reversed. Id. at 123, 642 A.2d at 384
(Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
It is axiomatic that courts are in the business of drawing lines,
but the court in Dunphy appears to fear the task of drawing lines.
Indeed, the majority posits that it does not want to hastily draw a
bright line. The California courts, however, make the better argument that it is imperative to draw a very bright line, particularly in
the area of bystander liability. With the supreme court's new definition of bystander liability, the danger of indefiniteness and unpredictability leading to an inconsistent case by case application is
readily foreseeable. Moreover, New Jersey courts' application of
this new, broader definition of bystander liability will surely place
an intolerable burden on society-actions and damages will be
multiplied, fictitious claims will be encouraged, and an unlimited
number of people to whom a defendant owes a duty of care will
ensue. Fearfully, the majority's decision might prove to be the genesis of unlimited liability in the area of bystander recovery.
Ironically, the court broadens this tort action in the midst of
great public concern with the American tort system, and in the
midst of a plethora of attempts to reform tort law. Of course,
courts should not necessarily be swayed by political or popular
opinions, but the majority's decision to augment the tort liability of
a society that is already far too litigious smacks of imprudence.
Irrespective of where the line is drawn, however, invariably
there will be those who arguably should fall within the safeguarded
peripheries of bystander liability. It would seem fair and sensible
to keep the bystander liability line drawn where it has been-separating marital and blood relatives from unmarried cohabitants.
Differentiating between married couples and unmarried cohabi-
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tants will, in the worse case scenario, maintain the status quo of
bystander liability rather than exacerbate an already problem-ridden tort system. Such a distinction would be in harmony with the
state's substantial interest in protecting and promoting the marital
contract, of which the state is a party. Finally, the court's failure to
demarcate between married couples and unmarried cohabitants in
bystander liability will surely prove to be inimical to the state's long
standing tradition of favoring the formal and sacred marriage contract over less socially productive and individually fulfilling relationships, such as in the case of unmarried cohabitants.
Kevin Michael Ross

